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MANAGING FEAR-BASED DEROGATION IN MURDER
TRIALS
John Rafael Perez†
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (“Rule 403”) governs all evidentiary decisions,
and yet its foundational nature often leaves it unsatisfactorily questioned and criticized. Rule 403 states, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”1 This relatively simple statement speaks volumes about the deeply held
values of the American adversarial system. Indeed, the need for undue prejudice to
substantially outweigh probative value reveals a preference for admitting evidence
even if that evidence may pose an unfair threat to a criminal defendant. This tendency
is defensible because over-exclusion of evidence could certainly prevent parties from
telling their full stories in court. For our system to deliver justice, however, we must
properly decide when the threat of prejudice is too great such that admissibility must
yield to greater values and ideals.
According to Yale Law School Professor Stephen Carter, the idea of unfair prejudice is incredibly unclear and understudied.2 Despite the concept’s proliferation in
judicial opinions, briefs, and academic articles, very few lawyers and scholars have
sought to comprehensively define the term and clearly delineate its boundaries. For
this reason, it is incredibly important to turn to the field of psychology, which closely
studies human attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions under controlled conditions, for
insights into the nature of “prejudice.”3 Indeed, psychological studies have informed
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1. FED. R. EVID. 403.
2. Stephen L. Carter, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Evidence Class on
Rule 403 (Jan. 2015). Indeed, this deficiency taps into a broader problem—that legal systems are seldom structured to account for predictable human frailties, even when there are dire consequences to allowing such frailties
to contaminate legal decision-making. See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence:
The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 138 (1990) (“The Supreme Court, however, has not
welcomed empirical research on jury behavior when deciding evidence and trial procedure cases. Instead, the
Justices seem to react to it with distrust and suspicion. They continue to approve legal rules based on intuitive
assumptions about human behavior that research by psychologists has shown to be erroneous.”).
3. See, e.g., June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine, Epilogue for Psychology and the Law, in LAW, JUSTICE,
AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 364 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977).
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our understanding of human behavior for decades but have surprisingly been excluded from mainstream legal discourse.4
This Article focuses on an important subset of psychological research to answer
a controversial question: To what extent should we admit gruesome visual evidence,
such as photographs of corpses, in murder trials? There is good reason to focus on
this question. In murder trials, the very life and liberty of the defendants standing trial
are at stake. Wrongful convictions born out of impermissible influences on juror decision-making deprive defendants of these constitutional guarantees while also eroding the legitimacy of the American justice system.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I discuss the prevailing Rule 403
approach to considering gruesome visual evidence in both federal and state courts.
Because the American judicial system heavily favors admitting evidence over excluding it for prejudice, gruesome visual evidence has become, for the most part, a
mainstay in murder trials. Part II critically analyzes narrative integrity, the only viable
rationale for the probative value of gruesome visual evidence in murder trials. By
picking apart the Supreme Court’s arguments in Old Chief v. United States, I illustrate that this rationale is unpersuasive. Furthermore, I argue that gruesome visual
evidence’s probative value, at least in the context of murder trials, is relatively low.
In Part III, I discuss how the countervailing prejudice to the defendant caused by
gruesome visual evidence far outweighs the evidence’s nominal probative value. By
focusing on the robust psychological literature on Terror Management Theory, I argue that the effects of gruesome visual evidence are the very definition of unfairly
prejudicial. Part IV then outlines two potential solutions that can be accomplished
either by the amendment of relevant evidentiary codes or judicial reinterpretation of
admissibility standards: (1) categorical exclusions of gruesome visual evidence and
(2) shifting to a presumption of prejudice in the Rule 403 balancing test. I justify
these solutions’ viability with reference to both current practice in state and federal
courts as well as more forward-looking normative arguments about desirable law and
policy. Finally, Part V responds to a host of counterarguments to this proposal. In the
course of addressing these counterarguments, I discuss the fallibility of human actors,
the inadequacy of existing ad hoc solutions, the importance of rule modifications in
instituting broad policy changes, and the extent to which this proposal can be harmonized with the prosecutor’s role and the adversarial system more broadly. I conclude
on a hopeful note—that our growing knowledge of human cognition situates us well
to align our legal rules with our greater ideals.
I.

THE PROBATIVE PRESUMPTION AND ADVERSARIAL STORYTELLING

The very language of Rule 403 expresses a preference for admissibility over exclusion. Not only does the rule require that prejudice substantially outweigh probative value to justify exclusion, but it even makes it discretionary to exclude substantially prejudicial evidence at all.5 Because all fifty states have adopted the language
4. See, e.g., Tanford, supra note 2, at 138. Furthermore, psychology is only growing in its importance,
given its relevance to many of our most controversial and divisive contemporary legal and policy issues. See,
e.g., Roseanna Sommers, Note, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304
(2016).
5. FED. R. EVID. 403 (explaining that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence,” arguably making the
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of the Federal Rules of Evidence,6 it is no surprise that courts across jurisdictions
share this same inclination, particularly when faced with requests to introduce gruesome visual photographs into evidence. To name just one example out of hundreds,7
in State v. Hollis,8 the Kansas Supreme Court determined that photographs of shooting victims and snapshots of naked corpses stabbed multiple times were admissible.9
Despite the grisly nature of these photographs, the court articulated the principle that
such photographs were “not inadmissible because they [were] shocking or gruesome
[as long as] they [were] relevant to material matters at issue.”10
A. Stretching Admissibility Too Far
The most troubling aspect of the tendency to admit gruesome visual evidence is
how far courts have gone in relaxing the standard, almost eliminating the practical
force of Rule 403 altogether, at least for photographs of corpses. To name just one
example, in In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, the Fifth Circuit found no
error in the admission of photographs of victims charred by fire in a plane crash.11
exclusion of substantially prejudicial evidence completely optional (emphasis added)).
6. See MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c); ALA. R. EVID. 403; ALASKA R. EVID. 403; ARIZ. R. EVID. 403; ARK.
R. EVID. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352; COLO. R. EVID. 403; CONN. CODE EVID. § 4034-3; DEL. R. EVID. 403;
FLA. STAT. § 90.403; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-403; HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-403; IDAHO R. EVID. 403; ILL. R.
EVID. 403; IND. R. EVID. 403; IOWA R. EVID. 5.403; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445; KY. R. EVID. 403; LA. CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 403; ME. R. EVID. 403; MD. R. EVID. 5-403; MASS. GUIDE EVID. art. IV, § 403; MICH. R. EVID.
403; MINN. R. EVID. 403; MISS. R. EVID. 403; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 26-10-403; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035; N.H. R. EVID. 403; N.J. R. EVID. 403; N.M. R. ANN. § 11-403; N.C. GEN. STAT. §
8C-1-403; N.D. R. EVID. 403; OHIO R. EVID. 403; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2403; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.160; PA. R.
EVID. 403; R.I. R. EVID. 403; S.C. R. EVID. 403; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-403; TENN. R. EVID. 403; TEX.
R. EVID. 403; UTAH R. EVID. 403; VT. R. EVID. 403; VA. R. EVID. 2:403; WASH. R. EVID. 403; W. VA. R. EVID.
403; WIS. STAT. § 904.03; WYO. R. EVID. 403; Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. 1996)
(“We will follow the policy set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403 . . . .”); People v. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d
728, 732 (N.Y. 1988) (“[R]elevant evidence . . . may still be excluded . . . if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger that it will unfairly prejudice the other side . . . .”); see also GUAM R. EVID. 403;
FORT BELKNAP TRIBAL CODE tit. VI, § 4; Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Saimon, 3 N. Mar.
I. 365, 375-376 (1992); UNIF. R. EVID. 403.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 1979); Lickliter v. Chandler, No.
5:08-CV-313-JMH/REW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117024, at *51 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 2011); People v. Degorski,
998 N.E.2d 637, 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); People v. Mills, 537 N.W.2d 909, 917-19 (Mich. 1995); Elliot v.
Kesler, 799 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Fisher, No. 65562, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2601, at
*3-*8 (June 16, 1994); Henderson v. State, No. 01-05-00499-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5644, at *10-*11
(June 29, 2006); 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 979 (2014); 1 ART OF ADVOCACY - DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
§ 10.06(4)(b) (2014) (explaining that exclusion of evidence for its gruesome nature is “unlikely” because “the
rule requiring the exclusion of a gruesome injury photograph, if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative
value, is vague and conclusory”); 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 403.03 (2014) (compiling cases
wherein the probative value of gruesome visual evidence outweighed the potential for prejudice); M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Admissibility of Photograph of Corpse in Prosecution for Homicide or Civil Action for Causing Death, 73 A.L.R.2d 769 (2014) (compiling cases from all federal and state courts wherein gruesome photographs were admitted into evidence); Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Admissibility in Homicide Prosecution
of Allegedly Gruesome or Inflammatory Visual Recording of Crime Scene, 37 A.L.R.5th 515 (2014) (compiling
cases from all federal and state courts wherein gruesome visual recordings were admitted). For a general account
of the evolution of gruesome visual evidence jurisprudence and the presumption of admissibility, see MARIANA
VALVERDE, LAW AND ORDER: IMAGES, MEANINGS, MYTHS 153-62 (2006).
8. 731 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1987).
9. Id. at 270.
10. Id.
11. 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985).
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The Fifth Circuit explained that even when “the testimony of the witnesses describing
the discovery and condition of the bodies was not contradicted, and therefore there
was little need to introduce the photographs,” the “photographs were not so gruesome
that their prejudicial potential absolutely required their exclusion.”12 Many state appellate courts have taken a similarly liberal approach on review.13 For example, according to the Maryland Court of Appeals, “[a]lthough [gruesome visual photographs] may be more graphic than other available evidence, like autopsy reports,
[courts] have seldom found an abuse of a trial judge’s discretion in admitting them
in evidence.”14
Putting aside the policy debate around the normative desirability of liberal admissibility standards, there is the legal issue of whether courts are properly interpreting Rule 403’s standard for probative evidence or confusing it with the similar but
distinct Rule 401 relevance standard.15 At this point, it is important to distinguish the
two. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as having “any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” when
“the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”16 As is apparent from the general language of the rule, the relevance threshold is very low. The determination of
probative value, on the other hand, is more discerning. According to the United States
Supreme Court, the analysis of probative value should look beyond the individual
piece of evidence in question and examine all available substitutes.17 Relevant evidence can still be excluded if its probative value, in light of the entire evidentiary
record and all existing alternatives, is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
In determining what the probative value, as opposed to mere relevance, of gruesome visual evidence is, it helps to examine case law from different jurisdictions.
Courts have generally justified the probative value of gruesome visual evidence
through a number of familiar rationales. In State v. Gerlaugh,18 for example, the Arizona Supreme Court found no error in the admission of photographs of a murder
victim’s body into evidence. The court explained that “[p]hotographs can be admitted
to aid in identifying the victim, to illustrate how the crime was committed, to aid the
jury in understanding testimony, and to show the location of mortal wounds.”19 In
addition to these stated reasons, courts have also justified gruesome visual evidence
as a way to refute an argument of self-defense20 or show the victim’s body positioning.21
The issue with many of these rationales, however, is that they still seem to fall
12. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 540 A.2d 1125, 1130 (Md. 1988).
14. Id.
15. Indeed, judicial opinions arguably reveal a conflation of these two standards. See, e.g., State v. Hollis,
731 P.2d 260, 270 (Kan. 1987).
16. FED. R. EVID. 401.
17. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-83 (1997).
18. 654 P.2d 800 (Ariz. 1982).
19. Id. at 805.
20. See, e.g., People v. Becker, 2 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. 1942); Waters v. Commonwealth, 124 S.W.2d 97
(Ky. 1939); Commonwealth v. Peronace, 195 A. 57 (Pa. 1937).
21. See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 63 F.2d 147 (D.C. 1933); People v. Jersky, 36 N.E.2d 347 (Ill.
1941); People v. Smith, 104 P.2d 510 (Cal. 1940); State v. Lantzer, 99 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1940); State v. Hamilton,
102 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1937).
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back on the relevance standard when they should be using the probative standard.
Indeed, courts acknowledge that while gruesome visual evidence may be relevant to
showing the location of a wound, for example, it is only one of numerous ways to
establish this fact in the record. In Pennsylvania, to determine a gruesome photograph’s probative value, the court must inquire into its “essential evidentiary
value.”22 Similarly, in Georgia, admission of a post-autopsy photograph “requires
that the photograph be . . . necessary to establish a material fact . . . that could only
become apparent because of the autopsy.”23 Many other jurisdictions have articulated
similar understandings of probative value that emphasize the idea of necessity rather
than mere relevance.24
Considering this emphasis on necessity, the aforementioned rationales for admitting gruesome visual evidence simply do not carry the day. Indeed, more often than
not, the stated purposes for introducing gruesome visual evidence can be fulfilled
through other means such as witness or expert testimony. There is, however, an important purpose for gruesome visual evidence that cannot simply be substituted
through other means: narrative integrity. The United States Supreme Court discussed
this rationale, in depth, for the first time in the landmark case Old Chief v. United
States.25
B. Narrative Integrity and the Story of Old Chief
In Old Chief, a defendant was accused of violating a statute that prohibited the
possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction.26 He offered to
stipulate to his prior conviction, and argued that his offer rendered evidence of the
name and nature of his prior offense—assault causing serious bodily injury—inadmissible because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.27 The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant,28 but not without first laying
out the value of narrative integrity. Specifically, Justice Souter wrote that “the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly,
that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary
22. Commonwealth v. Liddick, 370 A.2d 729, 730 (Pa. 1977) (emphasis added).
23. McCullough v. State, 341 S.E.2d 706, 706 (Ga. 1986) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
24. See, e.g., State v. Harper, No. E2014-01077-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 885, at *50
(Nov. 3, 2015) (“As a general rule, where medical testimony adequately describes the degree or extent of an
injury, gruesome and graphic photographs should not be admitted. Photographic evidence may be excluded
when it does not add anything to the testimonial description of the injuries. Autopsy photographs often fall into
this category. . . . If the defendant offers to stipulate to the facts shown in the photograph or the defendant does
not dispute the testimony that the photographs illustrate, the more likely the prejudicial effect will substantially
outweigh the photographs’ probative value” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Berry v. State, 718 S.W.2d 447, 451-452 (Ark. 1986) (citing cases with similar reasoning); State v. Collins, 727
S.E.2d 751, 758 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he extent to which an autopsy photograph corroborates other evidence or testimony increases its probative value. However, the probative value from a photograph’s tendency
to corroborate will vary depending on the facts of an individual case.”); discussion infra Part IV.B (analyzing,
in depth, Utah’s well-developed jurisprudence on essential evidentiary value).
25. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
26. Id. at 174.
27. Id. at 175-76.
28. Some courts have interpreted this ruling as applying only in “narrow circumstances.” See, e.g., Daniels
v. United States, 738 A.2d 240, 252 (D.C. 1999).
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force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.”29
The Supreme Court laid out a dual purpose for the value of narrative integrity.
First, the Court claimed that the “persuasive power of the concrete and particular is
often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law places
on them.”30 Specifically, “making a case with testimony and tangible things not only
satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive
richness.”31 Second, and according to the Court, more importantly, “there lies the
need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the jurors’ expectations about what
proper proof should be.”32 “If [jurors’] expectations are not satisfied, triers of fact
may penalize the party who disappoints them by drawing a negative inference against
that party.”33 “If suddenly the prosecution presents some occurrence in the series
differently, as by announcing a stipulation or admission, the effect may be like saying, ‘never mind what’s behind the door,’ and jurors may well wonder what they are
being kept from knowing.”34
The following two sections will work in tandem to address the viability of this
theory of narrative integrity based on both prongs of the Rule 403 analysis. Part II
will address the probative prong by critically analyzing the Supreme Court’s assertions about concrete evidence and jury gap-filling capacities. In Part II, I hope to
demonstrate that the probative value of gruesome visual evidence, examined through
the very rationales laid out by the Supreme Court in Old Chief, is relatively low. Part
III will then address the prejudicial prong by discussing contemporary psychological
literature on the damaging cognitive impact of exposure to gruesome visual evidence.
Through this discussion, I hope to illustrate, through an incredibly robust empirical
literature, that the prejudicial effect of such evidence is far too great a burden to permit.
The subsequent analysis is specific to the narrow situation wherein one side
attempts to introduce gruesome visual evidence in murder trials when other alternatives are readily available. I do not seek to attack narrative integrity wholesale, and I
acknowledge that narrative integrity may remain a crucial aspect of our adversarial
system in a number of cases. In the following sections, however, I argue that the value
of narrative integrity is minimal in this particular evidentiary circumstance and is far
outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the criminal defendant (and, perhaps, the threat
to our justice system’s legitimacy).
II. HOLES IN THE NARRATIVE AND REEVALUATING THE “PROBATIVE”
A. Unfounded Fears of Jury Backlash
It is unclear how the Court reached its conclusion that jurors “may penalize the
29. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186-87.
30. Id. at 187.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 188.
33. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering
Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (1978)).
34. Id. at 189.
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party who disappoints them by drawing a negative inference against that party.”35
Contemporary psychological literature on coherence-based reasoning has demonstrated that human beings have impeccable cognitive gap-filling capacities.36 If the
prosecutor omits a photograph of the victim’s corpse, but is able to construct a coherent narrative of guilt in all other respects, jurors should have no problem drawing
inferences of that defendant’s guilt based on the entire evidentiary record.37 Psychological research suggests that this is a far more likely outcome than jurors “penalizing” one party.
The well-documented confirmation bias phenomenon also casts doubt on the
Court’s concerns. The gist of this human tendency is that even the smallest types of
suggestions or persuasions as to a specific theory of a case may push individuals to
search for, select, and interpret information in a manner that confirms rather than
refutes the theory.38 Multiple studies have demonstrated this effect in the criminal
justice setting.39 For example, Steve Charman and colleagues found that participants
reported higher similarity between a suspect and a facial composite when they were
simply told that the particular suspect was guilty.40 Additionally, Nick Lange, and
colleagues found that participants who were verbally led to believe that a speaker was
suspected of a crime perceived more incriminating statements in recordings of that
speaker’s speech.41
It is staggering how little it takes to influence jurors’ attitudes, behaviors, and
cognitions. In a provocative set of studies at New York University, John Bargh illustrated how participants primed with words related to rudeness interrupted the experimenter with more speed and frequency than those primed with words related to politeness.42 In a second study, he demonstrated how participants primed with words
related to old age actually walked more slowly down the hall.43 Finally, and frighteningly, he also demonstrated that participants primed with African-American faces
exhibited more hostility towards an experimenter’s request.44 The experimenters
found such effects despite the faces being subliminally flashed for only thirteen to

35. Id. at 188.
36. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision-Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
242 (1986).
37. See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 36, at 523-29.
38. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL.
175, 175 (1998) (reviewing evidence of the confirmation bias in a variety of contexts).
39. For an extended discussion of this bias in the forensic investigation setting, see John Rafael Peña
Perez, Comment, Confronting the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 457 (2015).
40. Steve D. Charman et al., Exploring the Diagnostic Utility of Facial Composites: Beliefs of Guilt Can
Bias Perceived Similarity Between Composite and Suspect, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 76, 76
(2009).
41. Nick D. Lange et al., Contextual Biases in the Interpretation of Auditory Evidence, 35 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 178, 178 (2011).
42. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype
Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 231, 234-36 (1996).
43. Id. at 237-38.
44. Id. at 239.
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twenty-six milliseconds.45 If even unconscious primes can be tactically employed to
influence jurors, it seems unlikely that excluding an arguably duplicative piece of
evidence would substantially burden the party attempting to introduce it. Instead, if
something is missing in the narrative or if pieces are presented out of order, jurors
are likely to fill in the gaps based on the strength of the available evidence and the
plausibility of each side’s constructed narratives. If that is not enough to convince
detractors, studies even go as far as to suggest that more subtle types of suggestion,
rather than overt attempts at persuasion, can actually be more effective in pushing a
jury to decide issues in one’s favor.46 This finding flies in the face of the Court’s fear
that disallowing gruesome visual evidence, an overt tool of persuasion, would put
one party at a categorical disadvantage.
One may argue that, because the prosecution has the higher burden of proof in
criminal cases, they should not be deprived of a powerful tool of persuasion. In addressing this argument, it is worth considering that jurors bring their own expectations and preconceived notions with them into trials, and these schemas can be incredibly resistant to change in a way that benefits the prosecution.47 The manner in
which the legal system is portrayed in popular media, in particular, may have an impact on jurors’ susceptibility to persuasions of guilt. For example, there are countless
movies and television series that feed into society’s expectations that the criminal
justice system is always able to correctly determine the identity of an accused murderer.48 Of course we know that, in reality, this type of closure is not always guaranteed, given the general obstacles to complete information in both the investigation
and trial phases. Still, if jurors anticipate, based on their media-induced expectations,
that the perpetrator of a murder will always be identified and punished, they may
come in with a tendency to deliver verdicts that fit within the narrative of guilt to
which they have become accustomed.49 In other words, a finding of “not guilty” becomes much less psychologically satisfying because it doesn’t comport with jurors’
ideas of how the justice system is supposed to function. The danger of this preference
for guilty verdicts is only heighted by the psychological literature showing that
“blaming is often intuitive and automatic, driven by a natural impulsive desire to
express and defend social values and expectations.”50 Perhaps instead of framing the
discourse as one that highlights a miniscule loss to the prosecutor, we should
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Jack W. Brehm & John Sensenig, Social Influence as a Function of Attempted and Implied
Usurpation of Choice, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 703 (1966).
47. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 868-69 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Prototypes]; see also Vicki L. Smith, When
Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993); Vicki
L. Smith & Christina A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect?: The Influence of People’s Prior Knowledge of
Crime Categories, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 517 (1996).
48. See e.g., LEGALLY BLONDE (Type A Films 2001); Suits (Universal Cable Productions); The Good
Wife (CBS Productions). Even when movies or television episodes do not depict the perpetrator being found
guilty at trial, they often, at the very least, reveal the true identity of the perpetrator to the viewers, providing
them with some sense of closure. See, e.g., How to Get Away with Murder (ABC Studios).
49. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 729 (2010) (“‘Cultural cognition’ refers to the tendency of
individuals to conform their perceptions of legally consequential facts to their defining group commitments.”).
50. Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 257 (2012) (emphasis added).
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acknowledge how the prosecutor already starts out with a significant advantage51 because of juror schemas that favor closure, attribution, and blame.
It is also worth noting how selectively we tend to place our mistrust of the jury’s
innate abilities. To mistrust a jury with the task of making inferences despite gaps in
their knowledge while trusting them to separate any emotions they experience as a
result of exposure to gruesome visual evidence from the independent weight of the
evidence seems inherently contradictory. We entrust juries to make decisions with
incomplete information all the time, in almost every single trial. On the other hand,
contemporary court practices such as judicial admonitions, voir dire, banning propensity evidence, and excluding hearsay all seem to point to an acknowledgement of
the imperfection of human perception and cognition, and the unavoidable emotional
effects some types of evidence may have on a lay juror. At the very least, we should
turn to the psychological literature in making difficult policy decisions based on jurors’ actual capabilities and vulnerabilities.
B. Reconsidering the Value of Tangible Things
The Court’s other rationale that “making a case with testimony and tangible
things not only satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story
with descriptive richness”52 is arguably inapplicable in the context of murder trials.
First, with regards to the establishment of a crime’s formal definition, the crucial
factor for murder is intent. Pictures of corpses do very little to satisfy the formal
definition of the offense, which has to do with the mental state of the offender and
not the status of the victim. Indeed, the fact that someone died in a murder trial is a
given. Jurors don’t need, and are not likely to ask for, a photograph of the dead body
to confirm that. In the few instances wherein the picture of the corpse may give insights into the mental state of an offender, such as when wounds evince a deliberate
use of force or premeditation, such information can easily be imparted to the jury in
other ways, such as testimony, diagrams, charts, figures, or cropped or altered photographs.
The argument about a colorful narrative with rich descriptions is well taken. In
an adversarial system, each side must be able to present a persuasive story on behalf
of their client. Still, we must be wary of defining our system by its willingness to
promote adversarial storytelling rather than the extent to which it safeguards the values of due process. A prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the government is important, but it must be harmonized with every lawyer’s ethical duty to uphold the
primary purposes of our system—fairness and justice. First, it is important to reiterate
that most anything presented through a picture of a corpse can be presented through
other means. No information even has to be lost by gruesome visual evidence’s ex-

51. And this does not even touch on the significant resource disparities between prosecutors and defense
lawyers. See, e.g., C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Convictions in the United States, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 64 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008)
(“The adversarial system relies on the skill and resources of the prosecution and the defense, and nearly always
in criminal cases, the prosecution enjoys considerably more resources than does the defense. These resource
advantages include human resources (investigators, staff, etc.) and budgetary resources.”).
52. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997).
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clusion, and so perhaps the concerns about descriptive richness are overblown. Second, when the value of a colorful narrative is stacked up against the value of our
system’s integrity, it will be difficult to find a lawyer who values the former over the
latter. The following section of this Article engages in this complex value-based analysis by discussing, in-depth, why our system’s integrity is endangered by the admission of gruesome visual evidence and, consequently, why a relatively minor constraint on descriptive richness is entirely justified. Moreover, Part V will respond to
counterarguments about whether limiting the extent to which we admit gruesome
visual evidence endangers either the prosecutor’s role or the adversarial system more
generally.
III. STARING DEATH IN THE FACE AND EXPOSING UNFAIR PREJUDICE
Psychologists Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, and Sheldon Solomon first introduced Terror Management Theory in 1986.53 The theory is premised on the human
capacity for self-reflective thought, which creates a unique awareness of the inevitability of death.54 Reminders of human mortality, especially the presentation of gruesome visual evidence in court, may leave people “paralyzed with terror.”55 In fact,
hundreds of studies have utilized even less potent manipulations than gruesome photographs to elicit this psychological fear.56 The main way in which people cope with
this existential anxiety is to cling to “cultural worldviews” that imbue one’s existence
with “meaning, order, predictability, and permanence by means of stable cognitive
frameworks or narratives.”57 Such worldviews include a broad range of cultural, historical, religious, or political beliefs about how the world should function.58 These
beliefs provide a “prescription for leading a good, meaningful life” as well as “some
hope of [symbolic] immortality.59 In short, justifying these protective and comforting
beliefs is how human beings manage their terror.
A. Fear-Based Derogation of the “Other”
The natural consequence of people’s reliance on cultural worldviews to buffer
death-anxiety is the derogation of those who do not share these same views.60 This
53. Jeff Greenberg et al., The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management
Theory, in PUBLIC SELF AND PRIVATE SELF 189 (Roy F. Baumeister ed., 1986); see also THOMAS A. PYSZCZYNSKI ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF 9/11: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR (2003).
54. Greenberg et al., supra note 53, at 196.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Brian L. Burke et al., Two Decades of Terror Management Theory: A Meta-Analysis of
Mortality Salience Research, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 155 (2010).
57. Mark J. Landau et al., A Function of Form: Terror Management and Structuring the Social World, 87
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 190, 192 (2004); see also Jeff Greenberg et al., Proximal and Distal Defenses
in Response to Reminders of One’s Mortality: Evidence of a Temporal Sequence, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 91, 91-93 (2000) (“[D]eath-related thought . . . triggers symbolic cultural worldview defense.”).
58. See, e.g., Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence of a Terror Management Function of Cultural Icons: The
Effects of Mortality Salience on the Inappropriate Use of Cherished Cultural Symbols, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1211 (1995).
59. Greenberg et al., supra note 54, at 196.
60. See id. at 199-200 (“We suggest that the pervasive tendency of in-group members to display negative
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors toward outgroup members is an attempt to defuse the threat to one’s own beliefs
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effect persists because dissenting individuals pose a threat to the stability, self-esteem, and symbolic immortality created by cultural worldviews.61 Studies have operationalized this derogation in two ways: (1) participants’ attitudes towards individuals who criticize their worldviews explicitly and (2) participants’ attitudes towards
individuals who are merely from a different social group.62
Studies show that mortality salience63 causes people to manifest increased negative attitudes towards those who directly criticize their worldviews. For example,
one study showed that reminding American participants of their mortality resulted in
negative reactions towards a hypothetical interviewee with an unfavorable view of
the United States.64 Another study took terror management into the real world by
analyzing actual romantic partners.65 The study found that mortality salience reduced
feelings of commitment in couples that were asked to ponder the differences in their
worldviews.66
Furthermore, studies show that mortality salience causes people to manifest increased negative attitudes towards those who merely belong to a different social, political, or religious group. In particular, studies have shown how, under mortality salience, Christians react more negatively to Jews as opposed to other Christians,67

implied by the existence of the outgroup.”).
61. Derogation is not the only documented effect of terror management. Indeed, when reminded of their
death, people are more likely to rely on heuristic cues in analyzing the persuasiveness of specific arguments
rather than on deep, deliberate assessments of the merits of such arguments. See, e.g., Sheldon Solomon et al.,
The Effects of Mortality Salience on Personally-Relevant Persuasive Appeals, 23 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY
177, 177 (1995) (demonstrating that participants relied on expert status rather than argument strength when they
were aware of their own mortality); see also Diane M. Mackie & Leila T. Worth, Processing of Persuasive InGroup Messages, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 812, 812 (1990) (demonstrating a similar effect for
ingroup status). One explanatory theory for this effect is that coping with thoughts of death produces “selfregulatory fatigue.” Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Self-Regulatory Processes Defend Against the Threat of Death:
Effects of Self-Control on Thoughts and Fear of Dying, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49, 59 (2006).
In other words, because participants use so much of their cognitive resources defending against death thoughts,
they have minimal resources left over to engage in deliberate processing and overcoming cognitive heuristics,
stereotypes, and shortcuts. Id. It is easy to see how this effect works hand in hand with the derogation of others.
It is extremely difficult to critically assess one’s stereotypes and biases against those who challenge one’s
worldviews when one’s cognitive processes have already been depleted. In this way, the heuristic processing
effect and the derogation effect are inextricably linked.
62. Ya Hui Michelle See & Richard E. Petty, Effects of Mortality Salience on Evaluation of Ingroup and
Outgroup Sources: The Impact of Pro- Versus Counterattitudinal Positions, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 405, 406 (2006); see also Bernice L. Z. Khoo & Ya Hui Michelle, Mortality Salience and Evaluations
of In-Group Versus Out-Group Critics: The Role of Criticism Legitimacy and Perceived Threat, 44 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 242 (2014).
63. “Mortality salience” refers to an induced state wherein participants are made aware of their mortality
and the fact that they will someday die. This differs from terror management, which pertains to the subsequent
subconscious processes that participants use to cope with the resulting anxiety.
64. Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The Effects of Mortality Salience
on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or Bolster the Cultural Worldview, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
308, 315-17 (1990).
65. Amy Strachman & Jeff Schimel, Terror Management and Close Relationships: Evidence that Mortality Salience Reduces Commitment Among Partners With Different Worldviews, 23 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 965 (2006).
66. Id. at 973.
67. Greenberg et al., supra note 64, at 309-13.
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Italians react more negatively to Germans as opposed to other Italians,68 and Americans donate less to international as opposed to domestic charities.69 Participants in
these studies exhibited negative attitudes and behaviors towards an outgroup member
even without actual evidence that the outgroup member actually disagreed with the
participants’ worldviews. In short, the “mere existence of others” served to threaten
participants’ faith in their cultural worldviews.70
The terror management is one of a limited number of phenomena that have been
directly studied in the courtroom setting. Studies have shown that reminders of mortality that arise during the course of a trial can have a demonstrable impact on the
attitudes, behaviors, and most importantly, verdicts of legal decision-makers. Aaron
Rosenblatt’s seminal study of judicial decision-making is illustrative.71 In the study,
judges had to decide on an appropriate bond in the hypothetical case of an arrested
prostitute.72 Judges who wrote out their thoughts on their own death prior to the bond
assessment set a more punitive average bond of $455.73 Judges in the control condition, on the other hand, set an average bond of only $50.74 Rosenblatt also managed
to replicate this effect with ordinary individuals instead of judges,75 generalizing the
findings to jury decision-making as well. Rosenblatt determined that this punitive
effect76 was a likely result of the prostitute’s violation of participants’ worldviews
concerning conventional morality.77
Another study by Lori Nelson investigated how terror management affects the
68. Emanuele Castano et al., I Belong, Therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and
Ingroup Bias, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 135 (2002).
69. Eva Jonas et al., The Scrooge Effect: Evidence that Mortality Salience Increases Prosocial Attitudes
and Behavior, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1342 (2002).
70. Greenberg et al., supra note 64, at 310.
71. Abram Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory: I. The Effects of Mortality Salience
on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681
(1989).
72. Id. at 682.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 683-84.
76. Psychologists have also discovered a leniency effect following terror management in a narrow set of
circumstances. Specifically, Joel Lieberman flipped Aaron Rosenblatt’s seminal paradigm by placing the emphasis on the victim of the crime rather than the perpetrator. Joel D. Lieberman et al., Vicarious Annihilation:
The Effect of Mortality Salience on Perceptions of Hate Crimes, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 547 (2001). Specifically, Lieberman analyzed hate crimes by varying the distinctiveness of the victim. Id. at 556-57. When a hate
crime was described in abstract terms with no specific victim mentioned, participants were more punitive towards perpetrators of hate crimes. Id. at 561. Conversely, when the victim was described as gay, threatening
specific participants’ worldviews, participants were actually more lenient in their treatment of the perpetrators.
Id. at 556-57, 559, 561. This Note acknowledges the existence of the leniency effect but focuses primarily on
the punitive effect for three important reasons. First, the punitive effect is more robust, prevalent, and well
documented. See, e.g., supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text; sources cited infra note 83. Second, in murder
trials, the victim is no longer around, and so the likelihood that participants will anchor their decisions on the
victim’s characteristics are reduced. Third, the punitive effect is arguably the most systemically problematic
manifestation of terror management because of its potential to increase the rate of false convictions, sending
innocent individuals to lifetimes in prison or even death.
77. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 71, at 684-86. For further discussion of the punitive effects of mortality
salience, see Jamie Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom: Exploring the Effects of Mortality Salience on Legal Decision Making, 11 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 407, 413-22 (2005); and Donald P. Judges,
Scared to Death: Capital Punishment as Authoritarian Terror Management, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 155, 163,
167-69 (1999).
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apportionment of blame in adversarial situations.78 Nelson asked American participants to decide a hypothetical lawsuit between an injured driver and either an American or Japanese automobile manufacturing company.79 Participants that, prior to the
assessment, were exposed to a gruesome video involving burned corpses, blood, caskets, and graveyards, exhibited a nationalistic bias in their assessments of guilt.80
Specifically, participants under mortality salience were much more likely to blame
the driver rather than an American automobile company.81 This same bias was not
present when the automobile company was Japanese.82
For those who still have reservations about the robustness of the literature on
Terror Management Theory, it is helpful to look not just at the hundreds of empirical
terror management studies worldwide,83 but also at the theory’s theoretical overlap
with core psychological phenomena that have explained inequality and inter-group
conflict for decades. Examples include scapegoating,84 the outgroup homogeneity

78. Lori J. Nelson et al., General and Personal Mortality Salience and Nationalistic Bias, 23 PERSONAL884 (1997).
79. Id. at 886.
80. Id. at 886-89.
81. Id. at 887-89.
82. Id.
83. For additional studies that support the general predictions of Terror Management Theory, see Jamie
Arndt et al., Subliminal Exposure to Death-Related Stimuli Increases Defense of the Cultural Worldview, 8
PSYCHOL. SCI. 379 (1997); Orit Taubman Ben-Ari et al., Does a Threat Appeal Moderate Reckless Driving? A
Terror Management Theory Perspective, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 1 (2000); Burke et al.,
supra note 56; Alison Cook et al., Firing Back at the Backfire Effect: The Influence of Mortality Salience and
Nullification Beliefs on Reactions to Inadmissible Evidence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 289 (2004); Michael K.
Coolsen & Lori J. Nelson, Desiring and Avoiding Close Romantic Attachment in Response to Mortality Salience, 44 OMEGA: J. DEATH & DYING 257 (2002); Victor Florian & Shlomo Kravetz, Fear of Personal Death:
Attribution, Structure, and Relation to Religious Belief, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 600 (1983); YingYi Hong et al., The History of War Strengthens Ethnic Identification, 2 J. PSYCHOL. CHINESE SOCIETIES 77
(2001); Eva Jonas et al., Currencies as Cultural Symbols – An Existential Psychological Perspective on Reactions of Germans Toward the Euro, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 129 (2004); Mark J. Landau, Deliver Us from Evil:
The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1136 (2004); Ara Norenzayan & Ian G. Hansen, Belief in Supernatural Agents
in the Face of Death, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 174 (2006); Tova Rosenbloom, Sensation
Seeking and Risk Taking in Mortality Salience, 35 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1809 (2003);
Kumagai Tomohiro & Ohbuchi Ken-Ichi, The Effect of Mortality Salience and Collaborative Experience on
Aggression of “Third-Party Victims,” 62 TOHOKU PSYCHOLOGICA FOLIA 109 (2003); Kees van den Bos, Uncertainty Management: The Influence of Uncertainty Salience on Reactions to Perceived Procedural Fairness,
80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 931 (2001); and Kees van den Bos & Joost Miedema, Towards Understanding Why Fairness Matters: The Influence of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Procedural Fairness, 79
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 355 (2000). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., The Role of the Judge in the
Twenty-First Century: Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1253-57 (2006) (failing to
replicate previous terror management findings, but arguably because the mortality salience manipulation, having participants hear about a gravedigger, was simply not a potent enough manipulation).
84. See, e.g., Neel Burton, The Psychology of Scapegoating: Scapegoating Is as Ancient as It Is Deeply
Rooted, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hide-and-seek/201312/thepsychology-scapegoating; see also Carl Iver Hovland & Robert R. Sears, Minor Studies of Aggression: VI.
Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices, 9 J. PSYCHOL.: INTERDISC. & APPLIED 301 (1940); Edwin
Poppe, Effects of Changes in GNP and Perceived Group Characteristics on National and Ethnic Stereotypes in
Central and Eastern Europe, 31 J. APPLIED. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1689 (2001). For an account of how scapegoating
manifests itself more specifically in the terror management context, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Our Existential
Death Penalty: Judges, Jurors, and Terror Management, 32 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 64-75 (2008). (“If my
belief system protects me from the dread of death, your belief system threatens my protection. In response, to
save my protection, I must destroy yours.”).
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
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effect,85 social distancing,86 and dehumanization.87 In short, it is no longer productive
to doubt that these cognitive pitfalls do exist and exert a considerable impact on decision-makers. Instead, we should make the acknowledgment of these human shortcomings a major factor in crafting important legal and policy decisions.
B. The “Other” in the Courtroom
Terror Management Theory is highly relevant to the Rule 403 analysis because
it presents two potential routes for impermissible prejudice to infect the trial. First,
jurors reminded of their death may act more punitively towards those from visible,
discernible minority groups. Second, jurors reminded of their death may act more
punitively towards a criminal defendant solely because the defendant has been accused of murder, a worldview-destabilizing criminal offense. I will discuss both
routes in turn.
There is a robust psychological literature on how the group membership and ideologies of the accused can trigger increased punitive behavior in decision-makers
under mortality salience. Jurors reminded of their death may treat the accused in an
excessively punitive way based on factors such as race,88 religion,89 political views,90
gender,91 sexuality,92 national origin,93 or explicitly expressed opinions on deeply
held beliefs.94 Furthermore, psychologists have found that derogation processes are
most potent and robust when there has been a time lag between the presentation of a
85. See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 10 (2003); see also AMY
CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL
INSTABILITY 9 (“Markets concentrate enormous wealth in the hands of an ‘outsider’ minority, fomenting ethnic
envy and hatred among often chronically poor majorities.”). For literary perspectives on the long-standing and
embedded tendency to “other” members of an out-group, see, for example, GLORIA ANZALDÚA, BORDERLANDS
/ LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA 100-01 (2d ed. 1999).
86. See, e.g., Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Space Between Us: Stereotype Threat and Distance in Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91 (2008); Juan Manuel Falomir-Pichastor & Gabriel
Mugny, “I’m Not Gay. . . . I’m a Real Man!”: Heterosexual Men’s Gender Self-Esteem and Sexual Prejudice,
35 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1233 (2009); Janet K. Swim et al., Avoiding Stigma by Association:
Subtle Prejudice Against Lesbians in the Form of Social Distancing, 21 BASIC AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
61 (1999).
87. See, e.g., DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY WE DEMEAN, ENSLAVE, AND EXTERMINATE OTHERS (2012); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE
TURN EVIL 297-323 (2008).
88. See, e.g., Jeff Schimel et al., Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence that Mortality Salience
Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 905, 912-16 (1999).
89. Greenberg et al., supra note 64, at 309-13.
90. See, e.g., Holly A. McGregor et al., Terror Management and Aggression: Evidence that Mortality
Salience Motivates Aggression Against Worldview-Threatening Others, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
590 (1998) (demonstrating that participants allocate a particularly large portion of hot sauce for those who
threaten their political beliefs); see also Armand Chatard, Loss Shapes Political Views? Terror Management,
Political Ideology, and Death of Close Others, 32 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2 (2010); Lea Winerman,
The Politics of Mortality: Some Psychologists Say that Americans’ Fears of Death Could Have Given President
Bush
the
Edge
in
the
2004
Election,
AM.
PSYCHOL.
ASS’N
(Jan.
2005),
http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan05/mortality.aspx.
91. See, e.g., Jamie L. Goldenberg et al., Gender-Typical Responses to Sexual and Emotional Infidelity as
a Function of Mortality Salience Induced Self-Esteem Striving, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1585
(2003); Schimel et al., supra note 88, at 910-12, 916-18.
92. See, e.g., Schimel et al., supra note 88, at 918-21.
93. See, e.g., supra notes 68-69, 78-82 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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mortality reminder and the final decision.95 This is concerning because trials are often
drawn out ordeals with extended periods between the presentation of gruesome visual
evidence and the call for a verdict. If the goal of the court system is to reach objective
determinations of guilt based primarily on evidence and factual findings, this heightened potential for derogation is highly problematic.
Concerns about juror impartiality under mortality salience are exacerbated by the
racial and socio-economic inequalities inherent in the American justice system. Individuals accused of crimes often fit the mold of “outsiders” because they are racial
minorities,96 are of lower income status97 and educational attainment,98 are mentally
disabled,99 or come from generally tumultuous backgrounds.100 Conversely, individuals who tend to serve on juries are likely white101 and of the requisite economic and
social status to spend considerable time in jury service, a privilege that less affluent
individuals may not possess.102 These group membership differences between jurors
and those accused create an optimal environment for derogation by amplifying the
salience of the outsider.
Skeptics may argue that the diversity of a jury should neutralize these effects.
Indeed, twelve randomly selected individuals are likely to belong to different social
groups and possess different ideologies. As such, the discordance between the group
membership or ideologies of a single juror and the accused should, theoretically, not
significantly affect the outcome of the trial. Unfortunately, despite psychological research showing that jury diversity decreases errors in decision-making,103 the system

95. Jeff Greenberg et al., Role of Consciousness and Accessibility of Death-Related Thoughts in Mortality
Salience Effects, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 627, 627 (1994); see also Greenberg et al., supra note
57, at 91-93.
96. See Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008 Annual Rates
for 2009 and 2010, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Nov. 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf.
97. See, e.g., Peter Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice: Judges’ Verbal & Nonverbal Behavior in
Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 139-42 (1985); Melissa S. Kearney & Benjamin H. Harris, The
Unequal Burden of Crime and Incarceration on America’s Poor, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 28, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/04/28/the-unequal-burden-of-crime-and-incarceration-onamericas-poor.
98. See, e.g., Karen Heimer, Socioeconomic Status, Subcultural Definitions, and Violent Delinquency, 75
SOC. FORCES 799 (1997); Violence and Socioeconomic Status, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-violence.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
99. See, e.g., Michael Kroll, Buckle of Death Belt: The Death Penalty in Microcosm, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/chattahoochee-judicial-district-buckle-death-belt-death-penalty-microcosm (last visited Apr. 1, 2016)
100. See, e.g., Claire A. Ogilvie et al., Attachment & Violent Offending: A Meta-Analysis, 19 AGGRESSION
AND VIOLENT BEHAV. 322 (2014); Patrick Renn, The Link Between Childhood Trauma and Later Violent Offending: The Application of Attachment Theory in a Probation Setting, 4 ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 294
(2002).
101. See, e.g., Karen R. Humes et al., Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF COM. 4 (Mar. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.
102. John Fulmer, Jury Diversity Bill Now Law, DAILY REC. (June 22, 2010), http://nydailyrecord.com/blog/2010/06/22/jury-diversity-bill-now-law (“Minorities often are faced with jury-service problems
that most white, middle-class or affluent people don’t have . . . including a more transient population, language
barriers and being poorly paid for time spent in court. Poor and lower-class workers may have trouble obtaining
child care, or their employers are reluctant to lose them for the duration of a lengthy trial . . . . Many poor people
are transient . . . and the truth is many poor people are minorities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects
of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006).
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has lagged behind in adapting to this new information.104 Furthermore, even generously setting aside systemic problems with jury diversity in the United States, as well
as the reality of racialized and stereotype-driven uses of peremptory challenges and
jury selection techniques,105 this argument is undermined by another source of terrorinduced derogation. Specifically, the accused is extremely disadvantaged not just because he or she is likely a member of a discernible outgroup, but because he or she is
now associated with murder—a crime so heinous that it is systemically threatening
to the worldviews of practically all individuals.
A helpful framework for understanding this source of prejudice is the System
Justification Theory.106 This theory “posits a general human tendency to support and
defend the social status quo,” which causes people to behave defensively when they
“perceive a threat to the legitimacy of a system to which they are attached.”107 Decades of social science research have supported this proposition.108 Furthermore, an
individual may defend a system even when the system conflicts with that individual’s
ideological motives.109 Because of this bias for the system, “[t]hreats to the social
order can also increase people’s desire for revenge against the perpetrators of those
threats . . . in an effort to defend and protect the social order.”110 Social scientists
have uncovered pertinent manifestations of this behavior that are relevant to the
courtroom context. For example, in a study by Derek Rucker, participants treated
hypothetical criminals more punitively when the crime committed was highly threatening to the social system.111 Similarly, Cheryl Kaiser used system justification motives to elicit strong desires for revenge against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.112
Murder will no doubt instigate similar vengeful responses from jurors because
of the immense threat the crime poses to the social order. When criminal defendants
are accused of murder, they are tagged with an incredibly destabilizing label. Because
jurors under mortality salience need to cling to their worldviews, and worldviews are
commonly defined through the groups and concepts that individuals align themselves
with, the last thing jurors would want would be to associate themselves with someone
who has been accused of such a terrifying crime. As such, jurors may attempt to
unconsciously punish and distance themselves from the defendant. In other words,
the mere premise that a defendant could have committed murder may be enough to
put that defendant in a distinct group of “others.”
104. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Foster v. Chatman (2016), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015.01.30-Foster-Cert-Petition.pdf; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986); Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The
Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1988).
106. John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System Justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 881 (1994).
107. Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal
Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2006).
108. See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881 (2004).
109. Blasi & Jost, supra note 109, at 1129.
110. Id. at 1139.
111. Derek D. Rucker et al., On the Assignment of Punishment: The Impact of General-Societal Threat and
the Moderating Role of Severity, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 673 (2004).
112. Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., A Prospective Investigation of the Relationship Between Just-World Beliefs
and the Desire for Revenge After September 11, 2001, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 503 (2004).
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In sum, the literature suggests that those accused of murder are prime targets for
terror-induced derogation because of either tangible, discernible group membership
or simply because the crime with which they are associated is deeply threatening to
the social order. This is a tremendous problem if our justice system seeks to decide
cases on the merits rather than aggravated passions. Before discussing potential solutions, however, it is important to address a few clarifying points.
C. The Power of Visual Evidence
An important point to address is why we should focus primarily on visual evidence and not other types of potentially gruesome material such as written or auditory
evidence. The short answer is simply that, in murder trials, it is practically impossible
to inoculate the jury from every reminder of death. At some tipping point, broad exclusions will begin to eat away at any avenue the prosecution may have at carrying
out its role in the justice system. As such, we should strive to restrict only the most
prejudicial types of gruesome evidence while allowing prosecutors some leeway to
substitute unduly prejudicial evidence with less extreme alternatives.
Visual evidence presents the clearest danger of unfair prejudice. As Judge Posner
put it:
Physical exhibits . . . are a very powerful form of evidence, in some cases too
powerful, as we learn in Julius Caesar from Antony’s masterful demagogic use of
Caesar’s blood-stained toga and slashed body to arouse the Roman mob. After hearing a welter of confusing and contradictory testimony, perhaps of a technical nature . . . or being led through a maze of inscrutable documentation . . . the jury is invited to resolve its doubts on the basis of a simple, tangible, visible, everyday object
of reassuring familiarity. “Seeing is believing,” as the misleading old saw goes.113
The psychological literature seems to back up Judge Posner’s intuitions. Indeed,
in a 2006 study, David Bright and Jane Goodman-Delahunty presented participants
with either verbal or photographic evidence that was either gruesome or non-gruesome.114 They found that participants presented with the gruesome photographs experienced more negative emotions, particularly anger.115 This anger, in turn, moderated a significant increase in conviction rates when compared to participants not
presented with such photographs.116 Bright and Goodman-Delahunty explained that
negative emotions increase the amount of blame an individual ascribes to a particular
offender.117 The individual experiencing the negative emotions may relax his or her
interpretation of conviction standards, exaggerate negative evidence, or search for
information in a manner that confirms guilt.118 These reactions are well supported in
the existing literature.119
113. Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
114. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and
Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 190 (2006).
115. Id. at 192-95.
116. Id. at 195-96.
117. Id. at 187-88.
118. Id. at 188-89.
119. See, e.g., Lucille A. Jewel, Through a Glass Darkly: Using Brain Science and Visual Rhetoric to Gain
a Professional Perspective on Visual Advocacy, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 237 (2010); Benjamin V. Madison
III, Note, Seeing Can Be Deceiving: Photographic Evidence in a Visual Age – How Much Weight Does It
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To the extent that visual cues produce the strongest negative emotions, it is unsurprising that they lead to an increased willingness to convict based on the negative
emotions rather than the strength of evidence presented. Indeed, anger has been associated with increased attribution of blame, even for accidents.120 Additionally, angry people experience impaired cognitive processing and are more likely to rely on
stereotypes and heuristics to make quick attributions of fault.121 Furthermore, individuals feeling either disgust or fear may make more defensive attributions of fault
due to the anxiety that the fate of the victim will befall them as well.122 Returning to
Terror Management Theory, it is worrying to imagine how much worse the derogation effects would be with both emotionally-driven impulses and terror management
processes affecting jurors’ cognitive capacities.
D. The Focus on Murder Trials
There is a strong argument that, given the robustness of the psychological literature, the exclusion of gruesome visual evidence should apply to all cases, including
civil cases. In this Article, I have not gone this far for a few reasons. First, the use of
gruesome visual evidence in murder trials is the most pressing problem because the
defendant’s life and liberty are on the line. Since murder carries the harshest punishments our system deals out, it is vital that we turn our attention to reforming murder
trials first. Second, it may be practically difficult to instigate an expansive policy
change in one fell swoop without facing crippling resistance. Progress, at least in the
law, is generally made incrementally. Third, it is unclear whether non-death-related
gruesome images in civil trials, such as photographs of severed body parts in tort
cases, produce similar terror management effects. While it is highly probable from a
theoretical perspective, future scholarship should seek to extend the current Article
based on progress in both the legal and empirical literature.
To conclude, an exceedingly robust psychological literature points to a reality
we can no longer deny. We simply cannot continue to admit gruesome visual evidence as freely as we do without sacrificing our commitments to fair and impartial
trials. Cases should be decided on the weight of each side’s evidence rather than the
extent to which each side is able to arouse negative emotions and employ cognitive
distractions. The following section argues for two potential solutions.
IV. TURNING THE TIDES AND SHIFTING THE BURDENS
As Parts II and III have demonstrated, our current approach to gruesome visual
evidence, which values admission over exclusion, is deficient. It does not account for

Deserve?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 705, 724 (1984).
120. Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thoughts: The Effect of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563 (1998); see also
JAMES R. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY ON EMOTION (1982).
121. See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen, Emotions, Arousal, and Stereotypic Judgments: A Heuristic Model
of Affect and Stereotyping, in DAVID L. HAMILTON & DIANE M. MACKIE, AFFECT, COGNITION AND STEREOTYPING: INTERACTIVE PROCESSES IN GROUP PERCEPTION 13 (1993).
122. Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 116, at 188.
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the well-documented effects such evidence may have on jurors’ emotional and cognitive states.123 There are two viable options for correcting this problem. Both options
can be accomplished in two ways—either through the amendment of the jurisdiction’s rules of evidence or a corresponding judicial interpretation of Rule 403 (or a
state equivalent) that augments the standard for the admissibility of gruesome visual
evidence in murder trials.
A. Categorical Exclusions
An easy fix for the problems caused by gruesome visual evidence is to simply
exclude such evidence from the courtroom altogether, at least in murder trials. While
categorical exclusion may seem like a radical proposition,124 it is actually a relatively
familiar concept in our existing evidentiary frameworks. For example, the Federal
Rules of Evidence contain such exclusions. Rule 409 prohibits the admission of
“[e]vidence of furnishing, promising to pay, or offering to pay medical, hospital, or
similar expenses resulting from injury.”125 Similarly, Rule 610 prohibits the admission of “evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions . . . to attack or support
the witness’ credibility.”126 Moreover, general rules of privilege have almost sacred
significance in our justice system. In fact, just recently, a federal district court judge
ruled that the sanctity and certainty of attorney-client privilege takes precedence over
something as crucial as another defendant’s right to assert an advice of counsel defense.127
Rule drafters and judges can also soften a categorical exclusion by providing a
limited number of discrete exceptions. This approach permeates many of the Federal
Rules of Evidences as well. Indeed, the following are generally prohibited except in
limited circumstances: propensity or character evidence,128 remedial measures,129
compromise offers and negotiations,130 plea discussions that do not result in a guilty

123. Previous scholarship on this issue has proposed that we work within the current evidentiary system.
See, e.g., Stanley L. Morris, The Admissibility of Photographs of the Corpse in Homicide Cases, 7 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 137 (1966). I argue that the current system is untenable and must be modified to truly deliver
justice.
124. For a piece that expresses, through its tone, the general hesitance with which calls for categorical
exclusions are met, see Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Cases, 37 SW. L. REV. 965 (2008) (“Moreover, this is an essay, not a
tenure piece, and its brief discussion surely does not answer, or even address, every possible aspect of the idea.
But let’s see how serious we really are about totally eliminating (rather than just reducing) wrongful convictions,
by imagining a total ban on their known evidentiary sources—indeed, a ban that is immediately judicially enforceable—when the death penalty is at issue.”); id. at 984 (“Of course, as the Supreme Court once said of the
Treason clauses, an idea with a superficial appearance of clarity and simplicity can nevertheless be packed with
controversy and difficulty. Perhaps that is the case here but the seriousness of the question suggests that the idea
should at least be fairly considered.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125. FED. R. EVID. 409.
126. FED. R. EVID. 610.
127. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 132 F. Supp. 3d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
128. FED. R. EVID. 404.
129. FED. R. EVID. 407.
130. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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plea,131 liability insurance,132 and, most famously, hearsay.133 These exclusions are
commonly made on the basis of public policy decisions. For example, we exclude
remedial measures because of the “social policy of encouraging people to take, or at
least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.”134 We
also exclude compromise offers and negotiations because of the “public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes.”135 Moreover, we exclude plea
discussions that do not result in guilty pleas because “[e]ffective criminal law administration in many localities would hardly be possible if a large proportion of the
charges were not disposed of by such compromises.”136 As such, “free communication is needed, and security against having an offer of compromise or related statement admitted in evidence effectively encourages it.”137 If the public policies of
safety, peace, and even efficient administration necessitate exclusion of evidence,
then certainly the public policies of justice and due process for criminal defendants
should as well. Furthermore, it is worth noting that many of the policy rationales laid
out by the Federal Rules of Evidence are based mostly on the intuitions of individual
drafters or judges, while the dangers of gruesome visual evidence are empirically
backed by hundreds of psychological studies.
A categorical exclusion provides numerous benefits beyond shielding juror impartiality. A hard and fast rule promotes efficiency in the trial context that often requires hundreds of evidentiary decisions in a single day. This lightens the cognitive
load on judges and allows them to conserve their mental resources for the more nuanced and complex issues that come up.138 Categorical rules also create standardization in case outcomes both within and across jurisdictions because different judges,
with varying perspectives on the Rule 403 analysis, are all obliged to come out the
same way on certain issues. This fosters predictability and the increased likelihood
of equal treatment for all defendants under the law. This need for standardization is
becoming even more important given emerging evidence that various situational factors, even those as seemingly innocuous as the number of hours since a judge has
eaten, can significantly affect how punitively judges rule.139
One important counterargument to address is whether exclusions rob judges of
flexibility in what is usually a complex trial setting. First, as already discussed, any
categorical exclusion can be softened through the use of exceptions. Even if not every
gruesome visual photograph will create undue prejudice that outweighs its probative
value, evidentiary codes can account for this minority of cases while still maintaining
a default exclusionary rule. For example, we could carve out a specific exception for
131. FED. R. EVID. 410.
132. FED. R. EVID. 411.
133. FED. R. EVID. 801-07.
134. FED. R. EVID. 407 cmt.
135. FED. R. EVID. 408 cmt.
136. FED. R. EVID. 410 cmt.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Gailliot et al., supra note 61, at 59; Francesca Gino et al., Unable to Resist Temptation: How
Self-Control Depletion Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 191, 191 (2011); Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A
Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 495, 495 (2010).
139. See, e.g., Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
U.S. (2011), http://www.pnas.org/content/108/17/6889.full.pdf.
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photographs where the defendant on trial happens to also be in the photograph with
the victim’s corpse, establishing a very strong link between that specific defendant
and the murder. Second, as already discussed, just because we give judges the potential for flexibility does not mean they will necessarily be able to use it, due to the
limits of human cognitive capacities.140 Freeing up judges’ mental resources on “easier” issues backed extensively by psychological literature can actually improve how
judges tackle more nuanced and complex issues, enhancing the trial process on balance. Third, a little less flexibility is sometimes normatively desirable when appropriate. If enough empirical studies support a need for a relatively more rigid rule, it
may be wise to seriously consider that position.
B. A Presumption of Prejudice
A second solution to the issues posed by gruesome visual evidence is to flip the
presumption of the Rule 403 analysis in the context of murder trials. In other words,
instead of requiring unfair prejudice to substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value, we could require that the probative value substantially outweigh the unfair
prejudice instead. Variants of this approach seem to have been successfully adopted
into some jurisdictions’ evidentiary jurisprudence.141 The clearest example is the
state of Utah, which has developed extensive case law on the issue. It is instructive
to review this history in order to tease out the legal and policy rationales that have
entrenched themselves in Utah evidentiary practice.
The Supreme Court of Utah first verbalized its legal standard for gruesome visual
evidence in State v. Garcia.142 In Garcia, a jury convicted the criminal defendants of
second-degree murder after seeing five color photographs of the victim’s bloody
corpse and the surrounding crime scene.143 In reviewing the lower court’s decision
to admit the photographs, the court explained that it was crucial to determine whether
the danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighed “the photographs’ essential
evidentiary value.”144 The court further explained that “essential evidentiary value in
the context of potentially prejudicial photographs of the victim’s body” would “generally be inappropriate where the only relevant evidence they convey can be put before the jury readily and accurately by other means not accompanied by the potential
prejudice.”145
Just three years later, the court faced a similar issue in State v. Cloud.146 In Cloud,
a jury convicted a criminal defendant for the murder of his fiancée after seeing photographs of the victim’s bloody corpse and close-ups of the stab wounds.147 In determining whether the district court erred in admitting such evidence, the Utah Supreme
Court looked to past case law to determine whether the district court could have substituted the gruesome visual evidence for a less prejudicial type of evidence.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 140.
See sources cited supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983).
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 64.
Id. (emphasis added).
722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986).
Id. at 751-52.
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The court first discussed the 1968 case State v. Poe, where at issue were the
“admitted autopsy photographs of a homicide victim’s dissected brain cavity[,] to
illustrate the path of the fatal bullets.”148 There, the court found reversible error in
the decision to admit the photographs because all the relevant information that could
have been gleaned from the photographs had already been introduced by the lay and
medical testimony.149 Similarly, the court recounted the 1979 case State v. Wells
where the court reasoned that photographs of a homicide victim were “superfluous”
because the uncontested testimony of the medical examiner had already established
the facts that the photographs were allegedly introduced to establish.150 As such, the
photographs had “no evidentiary value except the hoped-for emotional impact on the
jury.”151
Following the reasoning in Poe and Wells and the general standard laid out in
Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court found error in the admission of the autopsy photographs. While the State argued that the photographs illustrated “the brutality of the
attack,” the court noted that there were multiple viable alternatives to the photograph
including the examiner’s testimony, the police officers’ testimony, and a visual chart,
all of which discussed the location and position of the body as well as the extent of
the wounds.152 The Utah Supreme Court then concluded that there was no probative
value to the photographs and reversed the conviction.153
Two years later, in State v. Lafferty, the Utah Supreme Court took the strongest
stance it had taken on the issue when it considered the admissibility of two gruesome
photographs of the corpses of a woman and a child.154 The Utah Supreme Court
stated, in relevant part:
Although the rule’s language seems to require a simple balancing of probative
value and potential for unfair prejudice, our past decisions have recognized that inherent in certain categories of relevant evidence is an unusually strong propensity to
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury. Evidence in these categories is uniquely
subject to being used to distort the deliberative process and improperly skew the outcome. Consequently, when evidence falling within such a category is offered, we
have required a showing of unusual probative value before it is admissible under rule
403. In the absence of such a showing, the probative value of such evidence is presumed to be “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”155
The court went a step further, however, in categorizing gruesome photographic
evidence as inherently prejudicial material:
[G]ruesome photographs will often be excluded because the required showing of
unusual probativeness cannot be made. This is because there is no legitimate need for
the gruesome photographs of a homicide victim’s corpse that prosecutors usually
seek to introduce. An important consideration in assessing the probative value of a
photograph is whether the facts shown by the photograph can be established by other
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 752 (citing State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968)).
Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
Id. (quoting State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.at 753-54.
Id. at 754-56.
749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988)
Id. at 1256 (emphasis added).
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means.156
The Utah Supreme Court then ruled that the lower court had erred by admitting
the photographs.157 Indeed, the nature of the wounds and the positioning of the body,
the reasons given by the prosecution for the photographs’ relevance, had already been
established by the testimony of the victims, police officers, and medical examiner.158
The photographs were “merely cumulative” of such testimony.159
Following State v. Lafferty, Utah courts eventually cemented the case’s reasoning by applying the “presumption of prejudice” standard to succeeding cases involving gruesome visual evidence.160 The current standard, summarized at length in State
v. Bluff, is helpful in conceptualizing how a presumption of prejudice would be “codified” in practice:
If, however, the photograph meets the legal definition of gruesomeness, it may
not be admitted absent a showing of “unusual probative value.” The burden is thereby
shifted at this stage of the analysis to the State to show that the probative value of
such evidence substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. It is true that shifting the burden to the State runs contrary to the general presumption of admissibility
favored by the Rules of Evidence. However, we have determined that this departure
from the general rule is both necessary and equitable. The decision to admit a crime
scene or autopsy photograph generally must be made early in the proceedings, before
its probative value can be easily ascertained. Given that this evidence, by definition,
has a tendency to confuse and inflame the jury, we believe it is appropriate for courts
to err on the side of caution and exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence unless the State
can show good cause for its admission.161
The logic used by the Utah Supreme Court is incredibly helpful in countering the
prevailing assumption that exclusion of a gruesome photograph affects the completeness of the evidence presented to the jury.162 Instead, courts can and should scrutinize
gruesome evidence more closely as parties can frequently make the same point in
ways that are far less prejudicial and threatening to the fairness of the trial. Many of
the facts that lawyers seek to establish through gruesome visual evidence, such as
body positioning or wound severity, can be established through verbal testimony
from victims, witnesses, police officers, and experts. Lawyers can also use diagrams
and auditory aides that support their narratives but stop short of attempting to play
on the emotions of the jury. Furthermore, with the rise of new technology, lawyers
can even digitally reconstruct replicas of crime scene images without contaminating
the jury with brutal, bloody images.163

156. Id. at 1256-57.
157. Id. at 1257.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., State v. Bluff, 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002); State v. Vargas, 20 P.3d 271 (Utah 2001); State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Utah 1993); State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989).
161. Bluff, 52 P.3d at 1224-25.
162. See e.g., State v. Gerlaugh, 654 P.2d 800, 805 (Ariz. 1982) (reasoning that gruesome photographic
evidence was necessary to “illustrate how the crime was committed, to aid the jury in understanding testimony,
and to show the location of mortal wounds” despite the availability of alternatives for establishing such facts).
163. See, e.g., Alliance Forensics: Digital Forensic Reconstruction Illustration and Animation, ALLIANCE
FORENSICS LABORATORY, INC., http://www.allianceforensics.com/srv_fanim.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2016);

24

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 43:1]

Utah’s evidentiary jurisprudence should not be interpreted as a deviation from
acceptable evidentiary practice. In fact, Utah’s specificity and clarity in describing
the reversed presumption aligns with the general standard endorsed by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Indeed, the Court has interpreted the very use of the word
“probative” in Rule 403 to denote a concept similar to Utah’s “essential evidentiary
value.” Specifically, according to the Court, evidence should not be analyzed as “an
island, with estimates of its own probative value and unfairly prejudicial risk the sole
reference points in deciding whether the danger substantially outweighs the value and
whether the evidence ought to be excluded.”164 This “would leave the party offering
evidence with the option to structure a trial in whatever way would produce the maximum unfair prejudice consistent with relevance.”165 Instead, “a reading of the companions to Rule 403, and of the commentaries that went with them to Congress,
makes it clear that what counts as the Rule 403 probative value of an item of evidence,
as distinct from its Rule 401 relevance, may be calculated by comparing evidentiary
alternatives.”166 This means “that a judge applying Rule 403 could reasonably apply
some discount to the probative value of an item of evidence when faced with less
risky alternative proof going to the same point.”167
What seems like an apparent counterargument is that a judicially initiated reversal of the Rule 403 standard directly contravenes the plain language of Rule 403. This
concern is misguided. As already discussed, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain
numerous general exclusions.168 These exclusions all follow the underlying principle
behind the Rule 403 analysis in that the drafters simply anticipated that specific types
of evidence’s prejudicial effect would almost always outweigh their probative value.
A reversal of the standard in the narrow situation wherein gruesome visual evidence
is introduced in murder trials is no different from any of these general exclusions.
Judges are just deciding that, in a majority of cases, these images’ cannot make the
requisite showing of probative value to warrant admission, in light of the undue prejudice the images could introduce.
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that, compared to a categorical exclusion, a reversal of the standard could be more open to abuse. Specifically, judges could use their remaining discretion to continue to accept rationales
such as identifying the location of wounds or showing body positioning as “substantially outweighing” gruesome visual evidence’s unfair prejudicial effect. To prevent
this, judges would need to create a strong body of case law that clearly catalogues the
exceptional circumstances in which gruesome visual evidence should be admitted in
the murder trial setting. Judges would also have to stay mindful of decoy rationales
that do not comport with the Supreme Court’s mandate of carefully considering evidentiary alternatives. That being said, however, we cannot underestimate the power
of a statutory or judicial amendment to an existing legal standard. An amendment
will very likely produce some sort of behavioral shift in judicial decisions or at least
Crime Scene Reconstruction, NAT’L CENTER FOR AUDIO & VIDEO FORENSICS, http://www.ncavf.com/articles/Crime-Scene-Reconstruction-articles.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
164. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182 (1997).
165. Id. at 183.
166. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 183.
168. See supra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
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put decision-makers on notice of the dangers of gruesome visual evidence.169 This
development will certainly be an improvement on the status quo and will only grow
in influence as it is slowly accepted and adopted.
V. ADDRESSING RESISTANCE AND REJECTING THE STATUS QUO
Throughout this Article, I have responded to a number of potential counterarguments. In Part I, I clarified that the purpose of this paper is not to attack the value of
narrative integrity wholesale, or to recommend that the entire system lean on the side
of exclusion. Instead, this Article is focused on a narrow but crucial subset of decisions involving gruesome visual evidence in murder trials. In Part II, I responded to
many of the Supreme Court’s stated rationales for the importance of narrative integrity and explained why they do not carry the day, at least in murder trials. In Part III,
I explained that the emphasis on visual evidence, instead of oral or auditory evidence,
is far from arbitrary. In fact, it contributes to a balanced system that gives prosecutors
a menu of different options that pose less of an unfair threat to defendants. Finally,
in Part IV, I explained why neither a categorical exclusion nor a presumption of prejudice approach is alien to our current system of evidence, contravenes the text of
Rule 403, or threatens judicial flexibility. In this final section, I hope to anticipate
and put to rest additional counterarguments that have not yet been explicitly addressed in the Article. In addressing these counterarguments, I expose the status quo
as simply untenable.
A. Cognitive Pitfalls of Jurors
When psychological research challenges our conception of the human capacity
for neutral judgment, it tends to be uncomfortable. Indeed, we all like to think that
we are mentally strong, capable, and intelligent individuals who can be fully trusted,
under any circumstances, with important decisions. One problem with this view of
human capabilities, however, is that it does not take the unconscious nature of terror
management into account. Unconscious biases “influence our behavior . . . but we
remain oblivious to their influence.”170 As such, they are notoriously difficult to identify, much less address.
Terror management is far from a maladaptive human quirk. Multiple social scientists have theorized that terror management processes are particularly entrenched
because they serve important evolutionary functions.171 The human “combination of
an instinctive drive for self-preservation with a [unique] awareness of the inevitability of death creates the potential for paralyzing terror.”172 Over the years, societies
constructed cultural systems and worldviews to mitigate such threats of death.173
These worldviews provide “meaning, order, permanence, stability, and the promise
169. See, e.g., discussion infra Part V.E.
170. See, e.g., MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD
PEOPLE, at xii (2013); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012).
171. See, e.g., Mark J. Landau, On the Compatibility of Terror Management Theory and Perspectives on
Human Evolution, 5 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 476 (2007).
172. Eddie Harmon-Jones et al., Terror Management Theory and Self-Esteem: Evidence that Increased
Self-Esteem Reduces Mortality Salience, 72 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 24, 24 (1997).
173. Greenberg et al., supra note 53, at 198-99.
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of literal []or symbolic immortality to those who live up to the standards of value set
by the worldview.”174 Human beings unconsciously and automatically cling to these
worldviews to preserve their self-esteem and buffer anxiety in the face of overwhelming threats.175
Furthermore, the specific worldviews that people subscribe to, relating to certain
ideologies and membership in social groups, can unconsciously cause prejudicial behavior from even the well intentioned. Anthony Greenwald produced the most famous demonstration of this unconscious derogation in their work on the Implicit Association Test.176 They found that participants who would have explicitly denied that
they were prejudiced towards African Americans demonstrated implicit negative responses towards them nevertheless.177 Commentators have attributed this automaticity to the fact that “connections made often enough in the conscious mind eventually
become unconscious.”178 Unsurprisingly, the cultural atmosphere plays a vital role
in the entrenchment of these implicit biases. For example, “[b]y five years of age . . .
many children have definite and entrenched stereotypes about blacks, women, and
other social groups.”179 These stereotypes are then further reinforced by “peer pressure, mass media, [and] the actual balance of power in society.”180 Attempting to
overcome these entrenched biases within the truncated framework of a single trial is
too difficult a task for any individual juror.
Also worth noting is the difficulty of discerning whether undesirable unconscious processes are ever properly thwarted prior to a juror’s verdict, despite what
the juror may claim or believe. People are simply bad at monitoring such unconscious
processes precisely because they occur “without awareness or intention.”181 Additionally, people are incredibly motivated to eschew suggestions that they may be
prejudiced. Indeed, in a meta-analysis of over a hundred studies on implicit biases,
Anthony Greenwald found “that impression management can undermine validity of
self-report measures in socially sensitive domains” such as discussions of race.182 As
such, it is unrealistic to suggest that jurors “fix” their automatic reactions after
they’ve been exposed to gruesome visual evidence. They may not know what to fix
174. Harmon-Jones et al., supra note 174, at 24.
175. Id. at 24-26.
176. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1465 (1998). To take the Implicit Association
Test online, see PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu (last visited, Apr. 1, 2016).
177. See Greenwald et al., supra note 176, at 1473-76.
178. Annie Murphy Paul, Where Bias Begins: The Truth About Stereotypes, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 1,
1998), https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/199805/where-bias-begins-the-truth-about-stereotypes. This
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or how to fix it, and they may be more focused on denying that they could have
unconscious prejudice at all.
B. Cognitive Pitfalls of Judges
If we can’t trust the average human capacity for self-reflection, we may believe
that judges, with their lengthy careers and wealth of legal experiences, are better
equipped to make decisions in the course of a trial than the layman. As such, one may
argue that these experts can be fully trusted to make the correct exclusionary decisions, regardless of the language of the relevant evidentiary rule. Unfortunately, that
may not be the case. As an initial matter, in most states, judges are elected rather than
appointed based on their credentials and illustrious careers.183 More importantly,
however, studies seem to support the idea that no one is immune from the limitations
of human cognitions, not even judges.
Judges are just as likely to be influenced by unconscious racial biases,184 arbitrary situational factors,185 and judgment errors caused by taking cognitive shortcuts
rather than engaging in comprehensive, deliberative processing.186 Most importantly,
however, terror induced derogation has been clearly demonstrated in judicial decision-making.187 It is an unfortunate truth that even those we entrust with key decisions in our justice system, who may have only good intentions, still fall prey to the
unconscious impact of gruesome visual evidence without even being fully aware of
it.
C. The Futility of Screening Jurors
Some may argue that even if we all suffer, to some extent, from unconscious
biases, there are surely individuals who are simply better at staving off these impulses. If that were true, then the way to target the effects of gruesome visual evidence would be to simply select, through the voir dire process and the use of peremptory challenges, the jurors least likely to fall prey to cognitive pitfalls.188 There is a
wealth of research investigating both potential “risk factors” for terror management
susceptibility as well as potential “buffers” against such susceptibility.
Social scientists have found that individuals with higher self-esteem are less vulnerable to the unconscious processes triggered by gruesome visual evidence because
self-esteem acts as a buffer against existential anxiety.189 A similar effect has been
found for trait-based self-control.190 Conversely, individuals who are high in authoritarianism—”a pattern of traits or generalized behavioral style characterized by high
183. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266-68 (2008).
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regard for authority, rigidity, conventionality, and contempt or disdain for those who
are worse off”—are more likely to derogate those who threaten their worldviews
when under mortality salience.191 In theory, retaining as many individuals with high
self-esteem and self-control and excluding those high in authoritarianism could help
neutralize the effects of terror management. In practice, however, this is infeasible.
The practice of strategically selecting and excluding jurors, commonly called
scientific jury selection, has gained a great deal of attention in recent years. Unfortunately, results of empirical evaluations of its effectiveness have not been especially
promising. Joel Lieberman argues that “methodological flaws associated with existing research prevent clear conclusions from being drawn.”192 Specifically, he outlines
the lack of meaningful definitions of successful outcomes as well as the concentration
of scientific jury selection in cases with wealthy litigants who are able to pay to
strengthen other parts of their litigation strategies as well.193 Furthermore, determining intangible characteristics such as self-esteem or authoritarianism requires standardized psychological testing with measures that are both reliable and valid. This type
of testing, however, has not caught on in the courtroom setting because of the costs
associated with it.194 Moreover, such testing is unlikely to catch on simply because
busy dockets and strained judicial resources will not permit extensive psychological
profiling of each and every juror.195
Even if comprehensive evaluations of jurors were practically feasible, it is unlikely that lawyers would use them properly. Lawyers’ preconceived notions of jurors, as well as the hypotheses they are interested in confirming, often bias their subsequent decisions in the jury selection stage.196 More troubling, however, is that
lawyers are frequently overconfident in their predictions regardless of the amount of
experience they have in their field.197 As such, given their already entrenched practices and beliefs, it would be difficult to get lawyers to take a step back and critically
examine the strategies they utilize when deciding the make-up of a jury,.
We also need to be cognizant of the deeply troubling problems of racialized jury
selection. Indeed, in a worrying recent case, Foster v. Chatman, the Georgia Supreme
Court did not find a violation in the prosecutor’s jury selection strategies even though
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evidence surfaced that the prosecutor had marked all the black jurors in green highlighter, ranked them, and clearly evinced an intent to have them all removed, leaving
an all-white jury to try a black man accused of murder.198 The fact that this is still a
glaring problem in our society makes it unrealistic to claim that we can magically
progress to selecting juries in a manner that takes nuanced psychological characteristics into account.
D. Unavailing Post-Hoc Measures
Another suggested method for overcoming the prejudicial impact of terror management is simply to confront mortality reminders head-on. This could be accomplished by educating jurors about gruesome visual evidence after they have been exposed to such evidence during the course of the trial.199 For example, lawyers could
present empirical evidence regarding the effects of unconscious processes on decision-making or ask for appropriate judicial admonishments during the jury instruction stage of the trial.
As an initial matter, any experienced trial lawyer will tell you that there is something misguided about this approach. Indeed, at Yale Law School, visiting practitioners and professors advise students, year after year, to think about the ramifications of
their in-court objections to certain types of evidence.200 Sometimes, objecting to prejudicial types of evidence actually brings them to the forefront of jurors’ minds due
to the increased amount of time spent discussing the evidence and the back and forth
that inevitably follows between the lawyers and the judge. Conversely, “[e]ven
though they know that the judge will order it stricken from the record and will instruct
the jury to disregard it, trial lawyers often introduce objectionable evidence they believe favorable to their client in the hope that jurors will nonetheless be influenced.”201 These common practices reveal an implicit understanding by litigators that
judicial instructions and clarifications may not serve as a complete panacea for the
influence of improper evidence.
Furthermore, it is patently incorrect to think of humans as machines that can
simply erase the effects of specific evidence upon instruction by a lawyer or judge.
Unfortunately, “[p]eople’s inability to disregard relevant but inadmissible evidence
has been shown in dozens of psychological experiments.”202 Similarly, studies have
shown that jurors do not set aside their erroneous understandings of the law even after
careful legal instructions from a judge.203 Indeed, “even relatively simple instructions
failed to revise subjects’ existing concepts enough to improve the accuracy of their
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decision making.”204
Targeting terror management directly faces its greatest obstacle in a phenomenon
known as the Reactance Theory.205 The theory posits “that when free behaviors are
threatened, the attractiveness of the threatened behavior increases.”206 For example,
in one of the first studies of reactance, Jack Brehm and John Sensenig asked participants to choose between two pictures of different people and then report their impressions.207 To induce reactance, some participants were told that a third party
thought the participants should choose one specific picture over the other.208 The rest
of the participants were merely informed of the third party’s personal preference.209
Participants who were merely informed of the third party’s preference were more
persuaded to deliver positive impressions of the preferred picture, presumably because the more overt attempt to sway the participants’ judgments threatened participants’ free behavior, thus increasing the attractiveness of the forbidden option.210
One can easily see how this phenomenon could spill into efforts to curb terror management in legal decision-makers. Warning decision-makers to avoid thoughts of
death could have the inverse effect of making death thoughts more attractive.
Even if decision-makers do not make the explicit choice to disobey the lawyer or
judge, attempts at inoculation may still have the more implicit effect of making death
thoughts more salient and accessible in jurors’ minds. This phenomenon, described
extensively in literature on the Ironic Process Theory,211 is most famously exhibited
by the “white bear” study. Specifically, in the seminal study of Daniel Wegner and
David Schneider, participants told not to think of a white bear increasingly reported
such thoughts occurring during the course of the experiment.212 Later studies demonstrated that this phenomenon could also affect cognitive performance. For example,
Christian Hart found that individuals who were trying very hard to remember pieces
of information recalled less of the information than those who were not trying as
hard.213 It is easy to see how this could similarly apply to jurors trying very hard to
suppress thoughts about death. Such jurors could ironically become less effective at
suppression due to the subliminal impact of inoculation efforts.
Finally, there is always a danger that, upon instruction, jurors may “overcorrect”
by excluding even valid influences on their legal decisions.214 Indeed, we do not think
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in discrete, mechanistic units. Instead, our thoughts and experiences are highly interconnected, and so the instruction to exclude one very specific piece could spill over
into pieces that can and should be taken into account in making findings of fact.
In sum, studies demonstrate that directly attempting to curb the effects of gruesome visual evidence carries its own sets of risks. Doing so may make jurors even
more susceptible to unconscious pitfalls than they were originally, either by creating
an attractive forbidden option or by making death thoughts more accessible in jurors’
minds.
E. The Value of Changing Rules and Standards
Critics may wonder what the point of a new standard is if it leaves open any
avenue for discretion, and thus abuse. Indeed, some judges may be able to strategically use even an altered legal standard to maintain the status quo through skillful
argumentation and interpretation. The response to this concern is that while rules are
certainly not a panacea, they still have incredible power, both practically and symbolically. Practically, a clear change in rules, accompanied by documents explaining
the reasoning for such rules, will significantly alter judges’ behavior. This is especially true for lower court judges who are often worried about being overturned.215
Symbolically, a change in rules symbolizes the values and aspirations of society.216
It represents a shift in the way people think about the principles underlying our system and the integrity of our procedures. In many ways, the stated values we espouse
through our rules shape society’s trajectory, and we have the obligation to make sure
that the rules point to a more just, fair, and impartial system, rather than simply giving
up on the exercise of prudent rule-making altogether.
F. Preserving the Prosecutor’s Role and the Adversarial System
Some may argue that gruesome visual evidence is one of the most important tools
for prosecutors in establishing guilt for the crime of murder, especially because they
have the higher burden of persuasion. I acknowledge that reality and I do not discount
the importance of the prosecutor’s ability to introduce crucial evidence. However, as
I’ve discussed extensively in Parts II and IV, we need to critically analyze the argument that gruesome visual evidence is, in fact, “crucial,” rather than a distraction
from the merits of a case. Additionally, instead of framing this proposal as one that
is anti-prosecutor, we should see this as an improvement that is pro-systemic legitimacy. Yale Law School Professor Tom Tyler explains that this faith in the system is
what motivates people to obey the law.217
This Article seeks to reconcile the prosecutor’s important role as an advocate for
the government with the prosecutor’s equally important role as an ethical practitioner,
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a defender of justice, and a prudent decision-maker. We see many instances of prosecutorial misconduct as an outgrowth of the American “win at all costs” culture.218
Restricting the extent to which prosecutors can use a tool that naturally lends itself to
interference with a jury’s impartiality, while also leaving open many evidentiary alternatives that foreground facts rather than passions,219 dissuades unethical practice
and allows ethical prosecutors to find new and creative ways to construct narratives
purely on the merits of a case.
Prosecutors should also be incredibly concerned about wrongful convictions. Indeed, the metric of success should not be confined to the number of convictions an
office can get, but also the extent to which the office avoids costly errors that can rob
innocent defendants of their life and liberty. Even going beyond the moral argument,
wrongful convictions cause an enormous amount of negative press and a decrease in
the entire system’s perceived legitimacy. In this manner, a more restrictive exclusionary rule for gruesome visual evidence may actually protect offices from backlash.
It could also shield individual prosecutors from internal and external pressures to
make use of strategies that could cause irreparable damage to a jury’s impartiality.
Finally, to the extent that we value the adversarial system, the proposals in this
Article only strengthen such a system by ensuring that both parties in murder trials
can employ their strongest arguments in ways that foreground facts and the merits of
a case instead of emotional and cognitive manipulation. This Article encourages comprehensive, thoughtful jury deliberations rather than a reliance on cognitive shortcuts
and problematic inter-group “othering.” Furthermore, this Article only seeks to increase the legitimacy and integrity of our unique brand of American justice by subjecting it to critical review in light of empirically supported proposals for change.
CONCLUSION
Our American justice system is not perfect. Legal decision-makers are not perfect. Human beings are not perfect. What I hoped to illuminate through this Article
is that, despite our shortcomings, our growing repertoire of shared knowledge gives
us all hope. We now have the incredible power to reform our systems in ways that
can reliably emphasize prudence, fairness, and equality. As such, we have the corresponding obligation to reflect on the type of justice we produce and strive to further
our society’s greater values and ideals through our laws and policies. It is my hope
that, over time, we can restructure our systems so that they do not take advantage of
human weakness but, instead, capitalize on the marvelous potential of human
strength.220
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